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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored by 
the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly organized 
by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and researchers 
from central banks and international organizations presented and discussed current 
research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, and the future 
challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of papers and the 
contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are being made 
available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the Bank of Greece 
and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will be published in the 
journal, International Economics and Economic Policy. Here we present the fifth 
of these papers. (The previous four were issued as Bank of Greece Working 
Papers No. 39 to 42.) In addition to the paper by Sebastian Edwards, the Working 
Paper also contains the contribution of the discussant, Enrique Alberola. 
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During the last few years there has been a renewed analysis in currency unions as a form 
of monetary arrangement.  This new interest has been largely triggered by the Euro 
experience.  Scholars and policy makers have asked about the optimal number of 
currencies in the world economy.   They have analyzed whether different countries 
satisfy the traditional “optimal currency area” criteria.  These include: (a) the 
synchronization of the business cycle; (b) the degree of factor mobility; and (c) the extent 
of trade and financial integration.  In this paper I analyze the desirability of a monetary 
union from a Latin American perspective.  First, I review the existing literature on the 
subject.  Second, I use a large data set to analyze the evidence on economic performance 
in currency union countries.  I investigate these countries’ performance on four 
dimensions: (a) whether countries without a national currency have a lower occurrence of 
“sudden stop” episodes; (b) whether they have a lower occurrence of “current account 
reversal” episodes; (c) what is their ability to absorb international terms of trade shocks; 
and (d) what is their ability to absorb “sudden stops” and “current account reversals” 
shocks.  I find that belonging to a currency union does not lower the probability of facing 
a sudden stop or a current account reversal.  I also find that external shocks are amplified 
in currency union countries.  The degree of amplification is particularly large when 




* This paper has been prepared for presentation at the International Workshop on 
“Regional and International Currency Arrangements,” organized by the Bank of Greece 
and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, February 24 – 25, 2006, Vienna.  I thank Roberto 
Alvarez for his assistance.   1
I.  Introduction 
  During the last few years there has been a renewed interest in analyzing the costs 
and benefits of monetary unions.  To a large extent this interest has been the result of the 
launching of the Euro in January, 1999.  Scholars, policy makers and analysts have asked 
what is the optimal number of currencies in the world.  More specifically, they have 
asked whether it would make sense for some countries to give up their national currencies 
and either adopt another country’s currency, or join other nations in creating a regional 
currency.  The first option – adopting another country’s currency – has generally been 
known as the “dollarization” question; the second option – creating a multi-nation 
currency – is known as the “independent currency union” question.
1 
  At the end of the 19
th century the world had a relatively small number of 
currencies.  There were a number of monetary unions – the two better known ones were 
the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union --, and many countries 
and territories used other county’s currency as legal tender.  These arrangements were 
dictated both by political as well as by geographical and economic considerations.  This 
is illustrated by the fact that the dependencies of Great Britain did not use exclusively 
sterling; they relied on a variety of currencies, including the U.S. dollar and the Indian 
Rupee (Muhleman, 1895). 
  Historically, the emergence of national currencies has been associated with 
political considerations and, in particular, with sovereignty.  Indeed, one of the first 
measures newly independent countries took during the nineteenth and twentieth century 
was to establish their own national currencies.  In his well-known article on optimal 
currency areas Mundell (1961) cited the following quote from John Stuart Mill: 
 
“[A]lmost all independent nations choose to assert their nationality by 
having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbours, a 
currency of their own.” (1894, p. 176).   
 
                                                 
1 “Dollarization” is used as a general term, even if the country were to adopt a currency other than the 
dollar, such as the Euro, or the Pound Sterling.   2
  It is perhaps for this political reason that, historically, in the Latin American 
nations there have been limited discussions on the creation of regional currencies.  To be 
sure, some Latin American countries have become officially dollarized – Panama since 
1903, Ecuador since 2000 and El Salvador, since 2001--, and some, including Argentina 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s have seriously considered dollarization.  However, 
discussions on the creation of regional, or sub-regional, monies have never captured the 
imagination of Latin American politicians or scholars.  In 1926, for example, there was a 
proposal to create a monetary union comprising Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. 
Although the supporters of this policy were prominent thinkers and politicians, and went 
as far as detailing the operational features of the union, there was very little political 
support for the idea.
2   Proposals to create a monetary union in Central America, or the 
Andean countries or, more recently, in Mercosur have never been more than academic 
exercises.  In a way this is surprising, since, at least in principle, certain groups of Latin 
American nations would seem to satisfy some of the basic criteria for an optimal currency 
area (OCA).
3 
  During the last few years a number of papers on (potential) monetary unions 
around the world have been published.
4  Most of these works have analyzed empirically 
whether particular groups of nations – including Latin American countries – satisfy the 
traditional and basic criteria for joining a monetary union.  In particular, most of these 
studies have analyzed: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle across countries and 
with respect to major nations such as the U.S. or the EU; (b) the degree of factor mobility 
within the potential monetary union; (c) macroeconomic convergence among the possible 
union members; and (d) the extent of trade and financial integration in the countries that 
would potentially form a monetary union (see Section II of this paper for a detailed, and 
selective, review of works on OCA in Latin America).  More recently, an important body 
of work has argued that the traditional OCA criteria are endogenous to the monetary 
regime.  In particular, the degree of trade and financial integration will tend to increase in 
                                                 
2 See Yañez, Bunge and Subercaseaux (1926).  It is interesting to notice that this proposal did not include 
Brazil. 
3  See, however, the review of works on the issue presented in Section II of this paper. 
4  See, for example, the papers published in volume 13(2002) of the North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance (as well as the literature cited in those papers).   3
countries that share a common currency.
5  In Table 1 I present a list of countries (and 
territories) with currency unions; this list includes both dollarized countries as well as 
countries that belong to independent currency unions.   
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a number of issues related to monetary 
unions, from a Latin American perspective.  I take, however, a different perspective from 
that of most works on the subject.  Instead of analyzing whether the Latin American 
countries satisfy the traditional OCA criteria, such as facing similar external shocks 
across countries, I analyze the empirical evidence on the economic performance of 
countries “without a currency of their own,” and I interpret these results from the 
perspective of the Latin American nations.  The empirical analysis presented in this paper 
is divided in two parts.  First, I investigate whether belonging to a currency union reduces 
the probability of a country being subject to: (a) “sudden stop” of capital inflows; and/or 
(b) “current account reversals.”  Both of these are important questions, since the Latin 
American nations have traditionally been subject to significant fluctuations in capital 
flows, and have experienced a large number of current account crises (Edwards, 2004).  
Second, I analyze the ability of monetary union countries to accommodate three types of 
external shocks: (a) terms of trade shocks; (b) sudden stops of capital inflows; and (c) 
current account reversals.  The question is whether, as opponents of monetary unions 
have argued, countries without a currency of their own incur in larger costs as a result of 
external shocks.  Again, this is a highly relevant issue for the Latin American nations, 
since they have historically had highly volatile terms of trade, and have been subject to 
wide variations in external conditions (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005).  In performing 
this analysis I use a new and large cross-country data set, and I control for the role of 
other relevant variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I review the literature 
on currency unions in Latin America.  I show that the vast majority of these papers 
analyze whether the Latin Countries – or a subgroup of them – satisfy the OCA criteria.  
In Section III I use a new comparative data set to analyze economic performance in 
countries with currency unions, from a Latin American perspective.  More specifically, I 
investigate whether countries without a currency of their own have a lower probability of 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1999) and Rose and Engel (2002).   4
experiencing two type of shock that are common in Latin America – sudden stops of 
capital inflows and current account reversals.  In performing this analysis I use random-
effect probit regressions on pooled data.  In Section IV I analyze the way in which 
external disturbances affect real growth in countries with different monetary regimes.  I 
present a model of the dynamics of GDP per capita growth, and I investigate whether the 
impact of external shocks on growth is different in countries without a currency of their 
own, or monetary union countries, and in countries with a national currency.  Finally, in 
Section V I provide some concluding remarks, and a word of caution on how to interpret 
the empirical results presented in this paper.  There is also a data appendix.   
 
II.  Monetary Unions in Latin America 
  In this section I discuss briefly and selectively the literature on currency unions in 
Latin America.  I define a country as belonging to a currency union if it does not have a 
currency of its own, and uses a “common currency” with other countries.  This “common 
currency” could be either another nation’s currency (i.e. the U.S. dollar) or it could be a 
regional currency.  The section is divided in two parts: First, I briefly deal with the 
theoretical literature on optimal currency areas.  In particular, I discuss what has come to 
be known as the “OCA criteria,” or prerequisites for a country successfully joining a 
currency area.  Second, I provide a brief review of the empirical literature on currency 
unions in Latin America.  
II.1  Optimal Currency Areas:  Theory and Policy Criteria  
In his seminal 1961 paper Robert Mundell developed the modern theory of 
optimal currency areas.  The main conclusion of his analysis was that “the optimum 
currency area is the region.”  By this, Mundell meant that when it comes to determining 
the scope of specific currency, the relevant entity is not a nation, but rather a region 
characterized by price and wage flexibility, factor mobility, trade integration and similar 
external shocks.  He argued that the in North America there were two optimal currency 
areas: one corresponding to the eastern United States and Canada, and the other 
corresponding to the western U.S. and Canada. 
Although Mundell’s original contribution is not technical – indeed, there isn’t a 
single equation or diagram in the paper --, he was very explicit in determining his   5
optimality criteria.  According to him, “[O]ptimality is here defined in terms of the ability 
to stabilize national employment and price levels’ (Mundell 1961, p. 179).  That is, his 
criterion is perfectly equivalent to minimizing a loss function on the square deviations of 
employment from its long term trend level, and of inflation from its target.  In that sense, 
Mundell’s criteria of optimality is consistent with that used in modern macroeconomic 
analyses.  
Subsequent research attempted to make Mundell’s theory operational, by 
developing a “checklist” of criteria that countries should satisfy in order to qualify as 
candidates for a (successful) currency union.
6   Generally speaking, it was thought that in 
countries than satisfied these criteria the benefits of joining a currency union exceeded 
the costs of doing so.  Initially this “checklist” was restricted to the type of real and 
structural variables and factors emphasized by Mundell’s original article.  With time, a 
number of macroeconomic, political, institutional and monetary variables have been 
added to this checklist.   
By now the list of OCA criteria, or main prerequisites for joining a currency 




•  Factor mobility, and in particular labor mobility, across the members of 
the potential union. 
•  High level of trade in goods across the members of the union.  
•  Different (or diversified) composition of output and trade across 
countries. 
•  Price and wage flexibility across members of the union. 
•  Similar inflation rates across countries. 
•  Financial markets should be integrated across countries. 
•  Absence of “fiscal dominance” in the individual countries.  
•  Low, and similar, levels of public sector debt in the different countries. 
                                                 
6  Another two important early contributions are McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), 
7   See, for instance, Bayoumi (1994), Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1997), De Grauwe (2001) and Tavlas 
(1991, 1992).   6
•  Similarity (or synchronization) of external shocks to which the different 
countries are exposed to. 
•  Political coordination across countries. 
 
The main point of this “Decalogue” is that if these conditions are met, the 
members of the union would not need to rely heavily on (bilateral) exchange rate changes 
when subject to external shocks.  In this case there will be a reduced need for 
implementing “expenditure switching policies,” and the benefits of a currency union – in 
terms of enhanced credibility, lower transaction costs, and lower and more stable 
inflation – would exceed the (potential) costs arising from giving up the exchange rate as 
a policy tool.  As Tavlas (1993) and Mongelli (2002), among others, have pointed out, 
such an extensive list of prerequisites introduces a number of practical policy problems.  
These include:  (a) the need to establish a ranking of criteria according to their 
importance; and (b) how to deal with cases when a potential OCA member satisfies some 
of the criteria, while another potential member satisfies a different subset of them.  The 
Euro zone, for instance, prioritized fiscal, monetary and financial considerations through 
the Maastricht Treatise.  This, however, needs not be the case for other currency unions. 
  One of the costs of a belonging to a currency union is that member countries give 
up monetary independence.   However, the extent to which monetary independence is 
actually lost will depend on the exact nature of the monetary union.  If the country in 
question unilaterally adopts another nation’s currency – as in the case of unilateral 
dollarization – monetary independence will be fully lost.  Moreover, in this case, 
seigniorage will also be lost.   In Latin America, for example, this has been the case in 
Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador.
8  If, on the other hand, a new common currency is 
adopted, monetary independence will only be lost partially.  This is so because members 
of the union will be represented in the governance structure of the new common central 
bank, and, at least in principle, would have a say on how the common or regional central 
bank policies are determined.   
There are circumstances, however, when loosing monetary independence may not 
be a cost.  This would be the case, for instance, if the country in question has historically 
                                                 
8 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).   7
abused this independence, and has generated very high levels of inflation.  Indeed, under 
these circumstances giving up the national currency and joining a currency union is a way 
of “tying the policy makers’ hands,” and achieving credibility.   This “credibility effect” 
of joining a monetary union – or more precisely, of joining a credible monetary union – 
has been emphasized with respect to the Euro zone and the new EU members from 
Central and Eastern Europe.  It has also been discussed in the Latin American context as 
one of the advantages of (unilateral) dollarization.  This point was made by Dornbusch 
(2001), who argued that by achieving credibility, Latin American countries that 
dollarized would experience a decline in (real) interest rates, and, thus, higher investment 
and faster growth.   
  As a number of authors have argued, many of the criteria listed in the “OCA 
Decalogue” listed above are endogenous to the monetary and exchange rate regime 
(Frankel and Rose, 1998).   More specifically, (neighboring) countries that share a 
common currency will experience an increase in bilateral international trade in goods, a 
point forcefully made by Rose (2000), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), among others.
  
Edwards (1999), and Powel and Sturzenegger (2003), on the other hand, have 
investigated the way in which the monetary regime affects interest rate behavior and the 
cost of capital, and have argued that a common currency will tend to increase the degree 
of financial integration.
  An implication of this endogeneity argument is that the “OCA 
Decalogue” should be analyzed in a forward-looking fashion, trying to determine what 
would be the effect of adopting a common currency on many of these variables and 
criteria once the union is implemented.   
II.2  Currency Unions in Latin America:  A Selective Review 
Most studies on OCA in Latin America have analyzed whether the countries in 
the region satisfy the OCA criteria, or, more specifically, a subset of them.  In this 
subsection I review some of the most important contributions to this literature 
In an influential early paper, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used Vector Auto 
Regressions to construct series of supply and demand disturbances in three regions:  
Europe, Asia and the Americas.
9  They then analyzed whether these disturbances were 
symmetrically distributed across the different countries in each of the regions.  Their 
                                                 
9   The Americas include 13 nations, including those in NAFTA and Mercosur.     8
results indicate that correlations of both output and inflation disturbances were low in the 
Americas.  Moreover, the groups of countries in the America’s region that exhibited a 
somewhat higher degree of correlation did not correspond either to NAFTA or Mercosur.  
For instance, the group with the highest co-movements in output and prices was Brazil, 
Ecuador and Peru.  The authors conclude that there is no evidence supporting the 
formation of a currency union involving Latin American countries – either among 
themselves, or with the U.S. or Canada.  Eichengreen (1998) extended this work, and 
analyzed whether the countries of Mercosur – at the time formed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay – constituted an OCA.  His analysis was triggered by the 
perceived instability between the bilateral exchange rate between the Brazilian and 
Argentine currencies.  His empirical analysis concentrated on understanding the nature 
and consequences of exchange rate variability within the Mercosur nations.  To do this he 
regressed alternative measures of exchange rate volatility on four of the “OCA criteria”:  
synchronicity of output disturbances, commodity composition of trade, bilateral trade, 
and country size.  He concludes that in the second half of the 1990s real exchange rate 
volatility in the Mercosur nations was significantly larger than what his model predicted. 
He argued, however, that a regional currency was not an effective option for reducing 
volatility; in his view the countries of Mercosur did not satisfy many of the OCA criteria.   
  Licandro Ferrando (2000) and Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) also analyzed 
whether the countries of Mercosur satisfied (some of) the OCA criteria listed in our 
“Decalogue.”  Licandro Ferrado (2000) focuses mostly on one of the synchronicity of 
real shocks.  He constructs measures of supply shocks for Mercosur, NAFTA and the EU 
and analyzes the extent to which these are correlated across countries.  He concludes that 
the degree of correlation among Mercosur nations is significantly lower than that of EU 
nations.  Shocks correlations among NAFTA countries are somewhat higher than in 
Mercosur.  His conclusion is that Mercosur is far from satisfying the OCA criteria.  
Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000) take a somewhat different approach, and concentrate on 
macroeconomic convergence and political coordination.  After analyzing historical data 
for Argentina and Brazil, and simulating macroeconomic conditions, the authors 
concluded that in (late) 1998 the large countries of Mercosur were not ready for forming 
a monetary union.     9
  Larrain and Tavares (2003) use data for South and Central American countries to 
analyze the extent to which some of the OCA criteria are satisfied.  An important 
contribution of their paper is that they make a distinction between two types of currency 
unions: dollarization and regional currencies.  They use an approach similar to that of 
Eichengreen (1998) and use regressions to analyze the determinants of real exchange rate 
volatility.  They also analyze the degree of asymmetry (or lack of synchronization) of 
output shocks, the composition of exports, and the extent of bilateral trade.  Based on 
their analysis they conclude that dollarization maybe an option for the Central American 
nations; neither dollarization nor a regional currency appears to be a good option for 
South America.   
Horchreiter and Siklos (2002) considered both static and dynamic arguments in 
their analysis of the potential for currency unions in Latin America.  These authors 
centered their analysis on the nature of aggregate shocks, fiscal policy, and business cycle 
synchronicity.  They investigated whether a treatise in the nature of Maastricht would 
help the Latin American nations achieve macroeconomic convergence.  Their conclusion 
was that “the LAC countries are not generally good candidates for monetary union.”  
Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002) also analyze the OCA criteria for a large group of 
Latin American nations.  They focus on: (a) the pattern of trade; (b) output growth co-
movements; (c) financial variables co-movement; (d) political coordination; and (e) 
credibility.  They conclude that “an independent common currency does not appear to be 
warranted for Latin American countries,” and that “there is no obvious case for 
dollarization.”   
In an extensive study, Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler (2002) analyzed 
Latin America’s prospects for a currency union, from the perspective of the European 
experience.   They make the important point that OCA criteria are dynamic, in the sense 
that countries that adopt a common currency tend to experience an improvement in some 
of the key OCA prerequisites, such as the volume of bilateral trade and the degree of 
financial synchronization.  Based on the European experience, the authors emphasized 
the need to coordinate fiscal policy in OCA countries, the importance of labor mobility 
and flexibility, and financial integration and supervision.  These authors arrived to two 
conclusions: “The available evidence on the costs and benefits of abandoning national   10
currencies suggest significantly less favorable conditions in LAC than in Europe.” And, 
[D]ollarization seems to be more feasible for smaller LAC economies.”  In a related 
paper, Kopits (2002) draws lessons from the new EU accession countries for Latin 
America, and concludes that in the absence of better macroeconomic policy coordination 
the Latin nations are not good candidates for a currency union.    
  Belke and Gros (2002) analyze the effects of exchange rate and interest rate 
volatility on macroeconomic outcomes in the countries of the Southern Cone.   They 
conclude that higher volatility has negative effects on both employment and private 
investment.  The authors, however, caution on the implications of these findings for the 
currency union debate; a complete analysis of the issue, they point out, would require 
investigating other OCA criteria, including the possibility of coordinating 
macroeconomic (and especially fiscal) policies.   
The paper by Panizza, Stein and Talvi (2003) is one of the few that provides an 
explicit and complete cost-benefit analysis of the decision to join a currency union.  They 
analyze whether it would pay off for the Central American nations to give up their 
currencies and unilaterally adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender.
10  They consider several 
benefits of dollarization, including lower real exchange rate volatility, increased 
credibility, reduced financial fragility, and a higher volume of intraregional trade.  The 
main source of costs is the lost of monetary independence; the extent of these costs are 
related to the nature of real shocks, the degree of labor mobility, and the extent to which 
the monetary authorities are willing to use their independence (this is the “fear to float” 
issue).  Their conclusion is that “several of the countries under study should give 
dollarization a serious consideration.”  Edwards and Magendzo (2003, 2006) analyzed 
the overall world experience with dollarization.  They use a variety of statistical 
techniques, including matching coefficients and treatment regressions.  Their findings 
indicate that dollarized countries have not had a different real GDP growth experience 
than countries with a currency of their own.  Inflation has been significantly lower in 
dollarized countries, while GDP volatility was larger in dollarized economies.    
After recognizing the endogeneity of many of the OCA criteria, Calderón, Chong 
and Stein (2002) investigated the likely effects of adopting a common currency on Latin 
                                                 
10   This, in fact, was done by El Salvador in 2001.     11
America’s intraregional trade and business cycle synchronization.  Their results suggest 
that, contrary to the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2001) for 
the EU, the impact of a currency union on these two variables is rather small in the Latin 
American region.   
Alesina, Barro and Terneyro (2002) use a very large data set to analyze the “best 
monetary anchor” for a number of countries; the alternative anchors considered are the 
US dollar, the euro, and the yen.  Their analysis is based on the effects of monetary 
integration on trade, price volatility and output volatility.  Their results suggest that there 
is an unambiguous “best anchor” for only a handful of Latin American nations: The Euro 
for Argentina, and the US dollar for Costa Rica and Honduras.  However, the fact that for 
Mexico and Ecuador the Euro is the “best” anchor according to one of the criteria, casts 
doubts on this analysis.  Tenreyro and Barro (2003) implement an instrumental variables 
approach to deal with the endogeneity of some of the OCA criteria.  Their results indicate 
that sharing a common currency increases the volume of bilateral trade, increases the co-
movements of national price levels, and decrease the co-movement of national outputs.   
Powell and Sturzenegger (2003) analyzed an often forgotten endogenous aspect of 
currency unions: the effects of a common currency on financial integration and country 
risk.  They use an event study methodology to analyze whether a reduction in currency 
risk – something that would automatically happen if a country unilaterally dollarizes – 
results in a decline country risk.  Using European data they find that there is a positive 
(and causal) correlation between currency and country risk premia.  However, the 
evidence for their group of Latin American countries is not as strong as the evidence for 
the European nations.   
To summarize, most of the literature on (potential) currency unions in Latin 
America has focused on investigating whether the countries in the region – or a subgroup 
of countries – satisfy (some of) the traditional OCA criteria.  Most of these papers have 
concluded that Latin America does not constitute an optimal currency union.  The results 
discussed in this section also cast doubts on the desirability of subgroups of Latin 
American countries of joining a currency union.    
 
   12
III.  Monetary Unions and External Crises: An Empirical Analysis from a Latin 
American Perspective 
   In this and next section I analyze empirically a number of issues related to 
monetary unions in Latin America.
11  However, in contrast with most of the existing 
literature reviewed above, I don’t ask whether countries satisfy some of the OCA criteria.  
Instead, I use a new large data set to investigate the evidence on the effect of currency 
unions on economic performance.  I focus on two aspects of performance that are 
particularly important for the Latin American nations: (a) the probability of facing 
external crises, in the form of either sudden stops of capital inflows, or large reversals of 
current account deficits.  And, (b) the effects of different shocks on economic growth, 
under alternative exchange rate and monetary regimes, including currency unions.  In this 
Section I deal with the first set of questions, while in Section IV I address the second set 
of issues. 
III.1 Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals in Latin America 
  Latin America’s economic history has been characterized by recurrent and 
massive external crises.  Large devaluations have rocked the economies of almost every 
country in the region at one point or another during the last six decades.  Many of these 
crises had their origins on large “sudden stops” of capital inflows, and/or were 
characterized by large and very rapid “current account deficits reversals.”
12    
  Table 2 presents tabulation data on the incidence of sudden stops for the period 
the period 1970-2001; Table 3 contains data on the incidence of current account 
reversals.  In both Tables I have considered six groups of countries – industrial, Latin 
America and Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Eastern Europe.  
Each Table also includes a Pearson test for equality of incidence across groups of 
countries.  I have defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in 
capital inflows to a country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of 
foreign capital.  More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode 
to qualify as a “sudden stop”:  (1) the country in question must have received an inflow 
                                                 
11 In the empirical sections of this paper the “Latin American” countries include the countries that the 
International Monetary Fund groups in the Western Hemisphere region.  These include Latin American and 
Caribbean nations. 
12 See, for example, Calvo and Talvi (2005) and Edwards (2004).   13
of capital (relative to GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two years 
prior to the “sudden stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 5% 
of GDP in one year.
13  On the other hand, a “current account reversal” – reversals, in 
short -- is defined as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP in 
one year.
14   
  As may be seen from Table 2, the global historical incidence of sudden stops has 
been 6.4%.  Different regions, however, have experienced very different realities, with 
the incidence being highest in the Middle East (11.3%), and lowest in the industrial 
nations (3.7%).  The Latin American nations have the second highest incidence of sudden 
stops, with almost 8% of all year-country observations. 
  The tabulation on current account reversals in Table 3 indicates that the aggregate 
incidence rate has been 12.8%.  As may be seen, Latin America has had the highest 
incidence of current account at 16%; the industrial countries have had the lowest 
incidence at 2.4%.
15 
From an analytical perspective sudden stops and current account reversals should 
be highly related phenomena. There is no reason, however, for their relationship to be  
exactly one-to-one.  Indeed, because of changes in international reserves, it is possible 
that a country that suffers a sudden stop does not experience at the same time a current 
account reversal.  An analysis of the global data shows that for the complete sample 
(3,106 observations) 46.8% of countries subject to a sudden stop also faced a current 
account reversal.  At the same time, 22.8% of those with reversals also experienced (in 
the same year) a sudden stop of capital inflows.  The regional data show that joint 
incidence of reversals and sudden stops has been highest in Africa, where approximately 
59.3% of sudden stops happened at the same time as current account reversals, and in 
Latin America where 25% of reversals coincided with sudden stops.  For every one of the 
                                                 
13 In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions of sudden stops, 
which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7 of GDP in one year.  Due to space considerations, 
however, I don’t report detailed results using these definitions. 
14 I also used an alternative definition.  The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not 
affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops.  See Edwards (2004). 
15  As pointed out above, the Latin American nations have also been subject to recurrent large devaluation 
crises.  Of course, these are eliminated if a country becomes “dollarized.”  Independent currency unions 
eliminate bilateral devaluations in the member countries; it is still possible, of course, that the common 
currency suffers a major devaluation relative to a convertible currency.  This was the case of the CFA Franc 
in January, 1994.     14
regions, as well as for the complete sample, the Pearson χ
2 tests have very small p-values, 
indicating that the observed differences across rows and columns are significant.  That is, 
these tests suggest that although there are observed differences across these phenomena, 
the two are statistically related.  Interestingly, these results do not change significantly if 
different definitions of reversals and sudden stops are used, or if alternative 
configurations of lags and leads are considered.  
Tables 4 and 5 look at current account reversals and sudden stops from a different 
perspective.  They provide data on the incidence of these two phenomena for currency 
union countries and for countries with a currency of their own.  Table 4 is a two-way 
tabulation for current account reversals, while Table 5 is a two-way tabulation for sudden 
stops.  As may be seen, the incidence of both of these phenomena is higher for currency 
union countries than for countries with that have a national currency.  As Table 4 shows, 
the incidence of current account reversals for currency union countries is 14.6%; the 
incidence for non-CU countries is 9.9%.  From Table 5 it may be seen that the incidence 
of sudden stops is 13% for currency union countries and only 6.3% for non currency 
union nations.  In both stables the Pearson chi-square test for the independence of rows 
and columns has a very low p-value.    
III.2  An Empirical Model 
A number of studies, including Edwards (2002, 2004) and Frankel and Cavallo 
(2004) have found that sudden stops and current account reversals are costly in terms of 
growth.  Countries that experience either of these phenomena have gone through 
significant and rather large declines in the rate of GDP growth.  An important question, 
and one that I address in this Section, is whether a country’s exchange rate/monetary 
regime affects the probability of experiencing a sudden stop or a current reversal.  In 
particular, I am interested in understanding whether countries that belong to monetary 
unions have had a lower probability of experiencing these phenomena.  A positive answer 
to this question would be important for the Latin American nations, as it would provide 
them with an institutional arrangement that would help them reduce the incidence of 
these negative events.  In other words, reducing the probability of sudden stops and/or 
current account reversals would constitute an additional “benefit” of currency unions, a   15
benefit that should be taken into account when evaluating the net effects of abandoning 
the country’s currency, and joining a union.  
In order to understand further the forces behind sudden stops and current account 
reversals, and to investigate the (potential) role of currency unions, I estimated a number 
of random effect panel equations on the probability of experiencing these two 
phenomena.  The empirical model is given by equations (1) and (2): 
 
 
1,    if   , 0
* > jt ρ  
(1)   jt ρ         =       





jt ρ    =     jt jt ε αω + . 
 
Variable  jt ρ is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a sudden stop (current account reversal), and zero if the country did not 
experience a sudden stop (current account reversal).  According to equation (2), whether 
the country experiences a sudden stop (current account reversal) is assumed to be the 
result of an unobserved latent variable
*
jt ρ .  
*
jt ρ , in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on 
vector tj ω .  The error term  tj ε is given by given by a variance component model:  
. jt j jt μ ν ε + =    j ν is iid with zero mean and variance
2
ν σ ;  jt μ is normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance  1
2 = μ σ .  One of the  jt ω in equation (2) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if during that year the country in question belonged to a currency 
union; that is if it was dollarized or if it was a member of an independent currency union.  
The data set used covers 187 countries, for the 1970-2001 period.  Not every country has 
data for every year, however; the panel is unbalanced.  See the Data Appendix for exact 
data definition and data sources.     16
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, and I included the following covariates:
16 (a) The ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP lagged one period.  (b) An index that measures the relative 
occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region (excluding the country itself) during 
that particular year.  This variable captures the effect of “regional contagion,” and I 
expect its coefficient to be positive.  (c) The one-year lagged rate of growth of domestic 
credit.  (d) The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.  (e) The 
country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs).  (f) A dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the country in question belongs to a currency union.  This dummy is called CU.  
The coefficient of this variable is of particular interest in this analysis, since it captures 
the effect of currency unions on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal or a 
sudden stop.  As is discussed below, in some of the regressions I interact the dummy 
variable CU with other regressors.  And finally, (g) in the current account reversal 
equations I also included (b) A sudden stop dummy that takes the value of one if the 
country in question experienced a sudden stop in the previous year.     
III.3  Basic Results 
The results obtained from the estimation of this variance-component probit 
model for a sample of large countries are presented in Table 6.  Columns A through C 
refer to the probability of a current account reversal; columns D through F are for a 
sudden stop of capital inflows.   
I first discuss the results for current account reversals in columns A-C.  As may 
be seen, the vast majority of coefficients have the expected sign, and many of them are 
significant at conventional levels.  The results may be summarized as follows:  Larger 
(lagged) current account deficits increase the probability of a reversal, as does a (lagged) 
sudden stop of capital inflows.  The results also support for the contagion hypothesis: the 
variable that measures the incidence of sudden stops in the county’s region is 
significantly positive in all of the equations.  There is also evidence that a faster rate of 
growth of domestic credit increases the probability of reversals.  Countries with higher 
GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal (coefficient marginally significant 
in some regressions).  Form the perspective of this paper, the most important result is that 
                                                 
16  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).   17
the coefficient of the currency union dummy is not significant in any of the regressions.  
In order to investigate whether CU affected the probability of a crisis in an indirect way, I 
interacted CU with other regressors.  The results (not reported due to space 
considerations) indicate that the coefficients were not significant.   
The results from the random effect probit estimates for sudden stops are reported 
in the last three columns in Table 6.   Broadly speaking these results support those 
obtained for reversals.  The currency union indicator is never significant (although now 
some of the point estimates are positive).  An increase in the (lagged) current account 
deficit increases the probability of a sudden stop, as does a higher incidence of sudden 
stops in the region.  A somewhat surprising result is that according to these results, with 
other things given, a higher “initial” level of GDP per capita increases the probability of a 
sudden stop.   
  To summarize, the results obtained from the random effect probit panel 
regressions indicate that currency union countries have not faced a lower probability than 
countries that have a national currency, of facing either sudden stops or current account 
reversals.  The next question, and one addressed in the Section that follows, is whether 
currency union countries are affected by external shocks – including reversals and sudden 
stops – in the same way than countries with a national currency. 
 
IV.  Monetary Unions and Economic Performance: An Empirical Analysis from a 
Latin American Perspective 
  In this section I investigate whether belonging to a monetary union affects the 
way in which external shocks affect a county’s rate of economic growth.  As pointed out 
in Section II of this paper, one of the costs of monetary unions is that countries give up 
independent monetary policy.  This means that exchange rate adjustments cannot be used 
as a way of absorbing external shocks, including terms of trade shocks, current account 
reversals and sudden stops.   How large these costs actually are, is an empirical issue.  In 
principle, if the countries belonging to a currency union have wages and prices flexibly – 
one of the OCA criteria – this cost should be rather low.  In this case external shocks can 
be accommodated through changes in domestic relative prices.   18
  The question of how to accommodate international terms of trade shocks is 
particularly important for the Latin American nations.  Traditionally, the countries in the 
region have been subject to substantial volatility in terms of trade shocks.   For the period 
1970-2000, for example, the standard deviation of rate of change of the terms of trade 
was 16.9%.  For the same period terms of trade volatility for the industrial countries was 
only 6.5%; in Asia terms of trade volatility was 14.5%, also lower than in Latin America.         
IV.1  An Empirical Model 
The point of departure of the econometric analysis is a two-equation formulation 
for the dynamics of real GDP per capita growth of country j in period t. Equation (3) is 




(3)     j j j j r x g ω θ β α + + + = ~ . 
(4)      jt jt jt jt j jt u v g g g ε γ ϕ λ + + + − = Δ − ] ~ [ 1 .    
 
 
j g ~  is the long run rate of real per capita GDP growth in country j;  j x is a vector of 
structural, institutional and policy variables that determine long run growth;  j r is a vector 
of regional dummies; α, β and θ are parameters, and  j ω is an error term assumed to be 
heteroskedastic. In equation (4),  jt g is the rate of growth of per capita GDP in country j 
in period t. The terms  jt v and  jt u are shocks, assumed to have zero mean, finite variance 
and to be uncorrelated among them. More specifically,  jt v is assumed to be an external 
terms of trade shock, while  jt u captures other shocks, including current account reversals 
or sudden stops.   jt ε  is an error term, which is assumed to have a variance component 
form, and λ, ϕ, and γ are parameters that determine the particular characteristics of the 
growth process.  Equation (4) has the form of an equilibrium correction model and states 
that the actual rate of growth in period t will deviate from the long run rate of growth due   19
to the existence of three types of shocks: vjt, u jt  and ξ jt.  Over time, however, the actual 
rate of growth will tend to converge towards it long run value, with the rate of 
convergence given by λ. Parameterϕ , in equation (4), is expected to be positive, 
indicating that an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a (temporary) 
acceleration in the rate of growth, and that negative terms of trade shock are expected to 
have a negative effect on jt g .
17  If, as previous work has found, current account reversals 
and/or sudden stops have a negative effect on growth, we would expect the coefficient γ 
to be significantly negative.   
In terms of the subject of this paper, the main interest is whether the coefficients 
of the external shocks v jt and u jt are different for currency union countries and countries 
with a currency of their own.  If giving up monetary independence because of 
membership in a currency union is costly, we would expect ϕ to be larger for currency 
union countries, and γ to be more negative in currency union countries than in countries 
with a currency of their own.  That is, in the absence of monetary independence and 
exchange rate flexibility, external shocks would be amplified.  If, on the contrary, the loss 
of monetary independence is not costly these coefficients would be the same – or very 
similar – across the two groups of countries.  
Equations (3) - (4) were estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step I 
estimate the long run growth equation (3) using a cross-country data set.  These data are 
averages for 1970-2001, and the estimation makes a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
These first stage estimates are then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates to 
replace  j g ~ in the equilibrium error correction model (4).  In the second step, I estimated 
equation (4) using GLS for unbalanced panels; I used both random effects and fixed 
effects estimation procedures.
18   The data set used covers 157 countries, for the 1970-
2001 period; not every country has data for every year, however.  See the Data Appendix 
for exact data definition and data sources.  In Sub-Section IV.3 I present some 
extensions.  
 
                                                 
17   See Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) for details. 
18 Due to space considerations, only the random effect results are reported.   20
IV.2  Basic Results 
In estimating equation (3) for long-run per capita growth, I followed the standard 
literature on growth, as summarized by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and Dollar (1992) among others.  I assume that the rate of growth of GDP 
( j g ~ ) depends on a number of structural, policy and social variables.  More specifically, I 
include the following covariates: the log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; 
the coverage of secondary education, as a proxy for human capital; an index of the degree 
of openness of the economy; the ratio of government consumption relative to GDP; and 
regional dummies.  The results obtained from these first-step estimates are not reported 
due to space considerations. 
In Table 7 I present the results from the second step estimation of the growth 
dynamics equation (4), when random effects were used.  The Table has six columns:  the 
first two contain the results for all countries with a national currency (independently of 
their exchange rate regime).  The next two columns contain the results for countries with 
a currency of their own and flexible exchange rate regimes.  Finally, the last two columns 
contain the results for currency union countries.
19 
As may be seen, the results are quite interesting.  The estimated coefficient of the 
growth gap is, as expected, positive, significant, and smaller than one.  The point 
estimates are on the high side -- between 0.79 and 0.92 --, suggesting that, on average, 
deviations between long run and actual growth get eliminated rather quickly.  Also, as 
expected, the estimated coefficients of the terms of trade shock are always positive, and 
statistically significant, indicating that an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of 
trade results in an acceleration (de-acceleration) in the rate of growth of real per capita 
GDP in our three samples.  As may be seen, the coefficients of the current account 
reversals and the sudden stops variables are significantly negative, in the regressions for 
the complete sample (Columns A and B) and in those for the currency union countries 
(Columns E and F), indicating that these shocks have been associated with a deceleration 
of growth.  Interestingly, these coefficients are not significant for the flexible exchange 
rate countries, suggesting that this group has been able to accommodate these external 
shocks without experiencing a decline in GDP growth.  From the perspective of this 
                                                 
19 I used the Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger (2003b) de facto exchange rate regimes classification.    21
paper, what is particularly important is that the point estimates of the shock-related 
coefficients are larger for the currency union countries than for the two samples of 
nations with a currency of their own.  Consider, for example, the specification in columns 
A, C and E.  The point estimates of the terms of trade shock are 0.071 for all countries 
with a national currency, 0.034 for the flexible exchange rate countries, and 0.099 for the 
currency union countries.  
2 χ tests indicate that these coefficients are statistically 
different across equations; the values of these t-tests are 7.8 for the comparison of 
currency union and flexible countries, and 3.8 for the comparison between currency 
union and all countries.  For the specifications in columns A, C and E the point estimates 
of the current account reversal variable are also larger in absolute terms for the currency 
union countries (-2.30), than for the flexible rates countries (-0.47 and non significant), 
and the all countries with a currency group (-0.74).  
2 χ tests also indicate that these 
coefficients are statistically different across equations (9.2 and 5.1, respectively).  Finally, 
these results also indicate that the effects of sudden stops on growth have been 
significantly more negative in currency union countries than in countries with a currency 
of their own.  Notice, in particular, that the coefficient of sudden stops variable is positive 
and non significant for the flexible exchange rate countries (Column D).  
Overall, then, the results reported in Table 7 indicate that countries that belong to 
a currency union had suffered a greater impact from external shocks than countries with a 
national currency.  The difference in the effects of external shocks is particularly large 
when the currency union countries are compared with nations that have had flexible 
exchange rates.  This result is particularly important, since it is precisely under flexible 
exchange rates that countries are able to exercise fully an independent monetary policy.         
IV.3  Instrumental Variables Estimates and Other Extensions 
  Instrumental Variables:  Some of the results presented above may be subject to 
endogeneity problems.  This is particularly the case of the specification that includes the 
current account reversals as a regressor.   In this section I present results obtained when 
instrumental variables random effect regressions for unbalanced panels were estimated.  
The results obtained are presented in Table 8, for the same three samples:  (a) all 
countries with a national currency; (b) flexible exchange rate nations; and (c) currency 
union countries.  In deciding which instruments to use, I took into account the results in   22
the preceding section on the probability of a country experiencing a reversal.  The 
following instruments were included:  lagged changes in the international terms of trade, 
lagged current account balance, lagged indicator for occurrence of sudden stop during the 
previous year, a lagged index of occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region 
(neighborhood), lagged international reserves over GDP ratio, lagged rate of growth of 
domestic credit.  As may be seen from Table 8, the results confirm the findings reported 
in Table 7.  The estimated coefficients for both external shocks variables – changes in 
international terms of trade and current account reversals – are significantly larger for the 
currency union countries than for the two samples of countries with a national currency. 
  Asymmetric Terms of Trade Shocks:  The results discussed above were obtained 
under the assumption that positive and negative terms of trade shock have a symmetric 
effect on the dynamics of growth.  This needs not be the case, however.
20  In order to 
investigate this issue re-estimated equation (4) replacing the terms of trade term by two 
regressors: positive terms of trade shock, and negative terms of trade shock.  The results 
obtained indicate that the effects of terms of trade shocks are asymmetric, with negative 
terms of trade shocks having a larger (negative) effect on growth than positive terms of 
trade shocks.  The results obtained for the specification with the reversals shock are 
presented in Table 9.   The difference in the point estimate for the positive and negative 
terms of trade shock are particularly large for the currency union countries.  
2 χ tests 
indicate that these coefficients are statistically different across equations.  Overall, these 
estimates, once again, confirm our previous findings, in the sense that external shocks 
have a larger effect on growth in currency union countries than in countries with a 
currency of their own. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I analyzed a number of issues related to monetary unions, from a 
Latin American perspective.  In doing this I have taken a different perspective from that 
of most works on the subject.  Instead of analyzing whether the Latin American countries 
satisfy the traditional OCA criteria, such as facing similar external shocks across 
countries, I analyze the empirical evidence on the economic performance of currency 
                                                 
20 See Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) for a discussion of this issue.   23
union countries, and I interpret these results from the perspective of the Latin American 
nations.  The empirical analysis was divided in two parts.  First, I investigated whether 
belonging to a currency union reduces the probability of a country being subject to: (a) 
“sudden stop” of capital inflows; and/or (b) “current account reversals.”  Both of these 
are important questions, since the Latin American nations have traditionally been subject 
to significant fluctuations in capital flows, and have experienced a large number of 
current account crises (Edwards, 2004). The results are robust and indicate that currency 
union countries have not faced a lower probability of facing a current account reversal or 
a sudden stop, than countries with a currency of their own. 
In Section IV I analyze the ability of monetary union countries to accommodate 
three types of external shocks: (a) terms of trade shocks; (b) sudden stops of capital 
inflows; and (c) current account reversals.  The question is whether, as opponents of 
monetary unions have argued, countries without a currency of their own incur in larger 
costs as a result of external shocks.  Again, this is a highly relevant issue for the Latin 
American nations, since they have historically had highly volatile terms of trade, and 
have been subject to wide variations in external conditions (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 
2005).  In performing this analysis I use a new and large cross-country data set, and I 
control for the role of other relevant variables.  The results obtained indicate that 
countries that belong to a currency union had suffered a greater impact from external 
shocks than countries with a national currency.  The difference in the effects of external 
shocks is particularly large when the currency union countries are compared with nations 
that have had flexible exchange rates.  This result is particularly important, since it is 
precisely under flexible exchange rates that countries are able to exercise fully an 
independent monetary policy.  
A word of caution in interpreting these results:  many of the currency union 
countries are small nations and/or territories.  Countries with a currency of their own, on 
the other hand, tend to come in all sizes.  It is possible, then, that the econometric results 
reported here are affected by this fact.  One possible way of dealing with this potential 
problem is by following Edwards and Magendzo (2002) work on dollarized nations.  In 
that paper propensity scores are used to define an appropriate control group; in a second 
stage matching coefficients are used to analyze the effects of dollarization.     24
The results reported in this paper provide useful evidence for evaluating the costs 
and benefits of countries joining monetary unions.  It is important to notice, however, that 
they do not provide a complete analysis of such a decision.  A definitive analysis would 
require considering other sources of costs and benefits, including gains in credibility and 













Christmas Island (dependency)  Macau (dependency) 
Cocos (Keeling) Island (dependency)   
Norfolk Island (dependency)  MOROCCO 
Kiribati Western  Sahara 
Nauru   
Tuvalu  NETHERLANDS  
  Netherlands Antilles (dependency) 
DENMARK  Aruba (dependency) 
Faroe Islands (dependency)   
Greenland (dependency)  NEW ZEALAND 
 Niue  (dependency) 
ECCA  Tokelau (dependency) 
Anguilla (dependency of UK)  Pitcairn Island (dependency of UK) 
Antigua and Barbuda   
Dominica  SINGAPORE 
Grenada Brunei 
Montserrat (dependency of UK)   
Saint Kitts and Nevis  SOUTH AFRICA 
Saint Lucia  Lesotho 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  Namibia 
   
FRANCE UNITED  KINGDOM 
French Guiana (dependency)  Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) (dependency) 
French Polynesia (dependency)  Gibraltar (dependency) 
Guadeloupe (dependency)  Saint Helena (dependency) 
Martinique (dependency)  British Indian Ocean Territory (dependency) 
New Caledonia (dependency)   
Reunion (dependency)  USA 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon (dependency)  Northern Mariana Islands (dependency) 
Wallis and Futuna (dependency)  Bermuda (dependency of UK) 
Andorra  British Virgin Islands (dependency of UK) 
  Cayman Islands (dependency of UK) 
SPAIN  Turks and Caicos Islands (dependency of UK) 
Andorra Bahamas,  The 
 Barbados 
BELGIUM  Belize 
Luxembourg  Ecuador (since 2000) 
 Guatemala 
CFA  Liberia 
Benin Marshall  Islands 
Burkina Fasso  Micronesia, Federated States of 
Cameroon Palau 
Central African Republic  Panama 
Chad  
Congo, Republic of the   
Cote d’Ivoire   








Source: Refers to the year 1996.  Cabasson (2003) 
   26
Table 2 
Incidence of Sudden Stops: 1970-2001 
 
Region  No sudden stop  Sudden stop 
    
Industrial countries  96.3  3.7 
Latin American and Caribbean  92.2  7.8 
Asia 94.9  5.1 
Africa 93.4  6.6 
Middle East  88.7  11.3 
Eastern Europe  93.7  6.4 
    
Total 93.6  6.4 
    
     Observations  2,943   
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  18.84   
         Design-based F(5, 14710)  3.76   
          P-value  0.002   
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Table 3 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals: 1972-2001 
 
Region No  Reversal  Reversal 
    
Industrial countries  97.6  2.4 
Latin American and Caribbean  84.0  16.0 
Asia 87.9  12.1 
Africa 83.4  16.1 
Middle East  84.0  16.0 
Eastern Europe  85.0  15.0 
    
Total 87.2  12.8 
    
    Observations  2,975   
    Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  77.88   
         Design-based F(5, 14870)  15.57   
          P-value  0.000   
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Table 4 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals for Currency Unions Countries and 
Countries with a Currency of their Own 
 
 No  Reversal  Reversal  Total 
     
No Currency Union  2,400 264 2,664 
  90.09 9.91  100 
  86.49 80.49 85.85 
     
Currency Union  375 64 439 
  85.42 14.58  100 
  13.51 19.51 14.15 
     
Total  2,775 328 3,103 
  89.43 10.57  100 
  100 100 100 
     
Pearson chi
2(1) =  8.6902 --  -- 
P-value  0.003 --  -- 
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Table 5 
Incidence of Sudden Stops for Currency Unions Countries and Countries with a 
Currency of their Own 
 
  No Sudden Stop  Sudden Stop  Total 
      
No Currency Union  2,337 158  2,495 
  93.67 6.33  100 
  88.99 78.61  88.26 
      
Currency Union  289 43  332 
  87.05 12.95  100 
  11.01 21.39  11.74 
      
Total  2,626 201  2,827 
  92.89 7.11  100 
  100 100  100 
      
Pearson chi
2(1) =  19.4378 --  -- 
P-value  0.000 -- --   30
Table 6 
Determinants of Current Account Reversals and Sudden Stops 
Random Effects Probit Regressions 
  
Variable  Current Account Reversals Sudden  Stops 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
        
Current-Account deficit to GDP 0.10  0.09 -- 0.07  0.07 -- 
 (10.21)***  (11.99)***  --  (7.16)***  (9.04)***  -- 
Sudden stop   0.39  0.39  --  --  --  -- 
  (2.04)**  (2.48)**  -- -- -- -- 
Sudden  stops  in  region  2.06  2.25 -- 3.96  4.47 -- 
  (4.16)*** (5.25)***  --  (6.71)*** (8.37)***  -- 
Domestic credit growth   0.0002  0.0002  --  -0.0005  -0.0000  -- 
  (1.78)*  (1.75)*  -- (1.11)  (0.45) -- 
Fiscal deficit to GDP  -0.002  --  --  -0.01  --  -- 
  (0.22) --  -- (0.85) --  -- 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.08  -0.04  --  0.23  0.25  -- 
 (1.67)*  (0.86)  --  (3.82)***  (4.22)***  -- 
CU --  -0.02  0.17  --  0.20  0.26 
  -- (0.14)  (1.26) -- (0.83)  (1.27) 
        
Observations  1515 1886 2653 1515 1954 2238 
Countries  95 118  143 95 119  127 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; All regressors are one-period lagged; constant term is 
included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   31
Table 7 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
Random Effects GLS Regressions 
 
Variable  Countries with national 
currency 
Countries with national 
currency and flexible 
exchange rate 
Countries with currency 
union 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
        
Growth  gap  0.79 0.80 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.92 
  (38.18)*** (39.37)*** (20.97)*** (21.61)*** (12.58)*** (11.09)*** 
Change in terms of trade   0.07 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.09 
  (11.22)***  (11.08)***  (2.69)*** (4.50)*** (4.59)*** (4.25)*** 
Current account reversal  -0.74 -- -0.47 -- -2.30 -- 
  (4.16)***  --  (0.63)  -- (1.98)** -- 
Sudden  stop  -- -0.28 -- 0.21 --  -1.79* 
 --  (2.74)***  --  (0.25)  --  (1.62) 
        
Observations  1642  1616  412 431 192 130 
Countries  84 78 64 63 10  7 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, but not reported.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   32
Table 8 
Current Account Reversals, Sudden Stops and Growth  
IV Regressions 









      
Growth gap  0.78  0.78  0.94 
 (31.67)***  (16.33)***  (9.42)*** 
Change in terms of trade   0.06  0.06  0.12 
 (8.22)***  (3.67)***  (3.70)*** 
Current account reversal  -3.27  -5.11  -9.48* 
 (2.42)**  (1.27)  (1.62) 
      
Observations 1336  382  121 
Countries 73  60  7 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, 
but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%;   33
Table 9 
Asymmetric Terms of Trade Shocks and Growth  
Random Effects GLS Regressions 
 








      
Growth gap  0.79  0.87  0.84 
 (38.18)***  (20.92)***  (12.56)*** 
Current account reversal  -0.69  -0.55  -2.11 
 (1.95)*  (0.72)  (1.80)* 
Positive change in terms of trade   0.06  0.04  0.07 
 (5.80)***  (2.35)***  (1.89)* 
Negative change in terms of trade   0.09  0.02  0.13 
 (7.77)***  (0.51)  (3.31)*** 
      
Observations 1642  412  192 
Countries 84  64  10 
Absolute value of z statistics is reported in parentheses; constant term is included, 
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Appendix 
Description and Source of the Data 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Current-Account  
Reversal 
Reduction in the current account 
deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one 
year. Initial balance has to be a deficit 
Author’s elaboration based on 
data of current account deficit 
(World Development Indicators) 
    
Sudden Stop  Reduction of net capital inflows of at 
least 5% of GDP in one year. The 
country in question must have 
received an inflow of capital larger to 
its region’s third quartile during the 
previous two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”   
Author’s elaboration based on 
data of financial account (World 
Development Indicators) 
    
Domestic credit 
growth  
Annual growth rate of domestic credit  World Development Indicators 
    
Fiscal deficit to GDP Overall budget to GDP   World Development Indicators 
    
GDP per capita  GDP per capita in 1995 US$ dollars  World Development Indicators 
    
CU: Currency Union  Dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the country in question 
belongs to a currency union  
Author’s elaboration based on 
Cabassos (2003) 
    
Growth  Gap  Deviation from long-run economic 
growth rate 
Edwards and Levi-Yeyati (2005) 
    
Terms  of  trade  Change in terms of trade-exports as 
capacity to import (constant LCU) 
World Development Indicators 
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DISCUSSION 
Enrique Alberola 
Bank of Spain 
 
The paper by Sebastian Edwards addresses the issue of the desirability of a Currency 
Union (CU) from a quite novel perspective which reflects the economic concerns of Latin 
American economists and policymakers. 
The approach considers the attractive of CUs in terms of reducing or solving a secular 
problem of the economy, which is perceived to be difficult to overcome by internal means. 
Indeed, this is very much the sort of argument that some European economies, in particular 
the so-called periphery economies emphasised when they assessed the benefits of EMU. In 
that case, the perceived benefit was monetary stability thanks to the merger of their weak 
currencies with traditionally low inflation countries. Note that this very same point could 
have been made by Edwards, since Latin America has suffered until recently from large 
price instability. The recent progress in inflation control, under  internal anchors –inflation 
targeting monetary regimes plus flexible, albeit rather managed, exchange rate regimes 
allows him to focus on a different and equally relevant problem: external financing 
stability. 
More precisely, the papers explores two questions: i) the differential probability  of 
current account reversals or  sudden stops occurrence and ii) the differential impact of 
external shocks on activity under a CU. A conventional answer –particularly from an 
European perspective- to both questions would be: i) in a CU current account reversals are 
not an issue and ii) the impact of external shocks is higher. The results found by Edwards 
are, respectively, the probability is not lower and the impact of external shocks is larger. 
The divergence of the first result merits an explanation which I will develop in the 
comments below, but in any case, the actual achievement of the paper is, in my view, that it 
puts the finger on a largely dismissed issue in  the literatures on Currency Unions MU 
(EMU) discussions, which it can be considered nonetheless relevant and increasingly so; 
namely, the Current account ‘sustainability’ in EMU. In my comments I will also reflect on 
this issue and on the conclusions which can be drawn at the light of the results both for   40
Latin America and Europe 
 
1. Scope for reversals in EMU and the experience so far  
In no country the current account or external imbalances within the regions are hardly 
an issue which merits attention and in many of them the regional accounts do not even 
compute them. Why?. First, because there is the understanding that the regions within a 
country (with a common currency) share a pool of capital and, therefore, there are no 
problems to finance the eventual deficits. Second, because even if, by any chance there 
were some perception of financial problems in  a region, the practical consequences of this 
would be minor. In the case of EMU as in any country, the sustained accumulation of 
external imbalances will imply a continued deterioration of the Net International 
Investment Position (NIIP), so that an increasingly higher amount of domestic resources 
will be devoted to pay for the returns on the net liabilities. At some point,  a large debtor 
position may make the markets aware-specially if this widening negative NIIP is 
accompanied by economic weakness- and they might impose some sort of risk premia on 
the external debt of a country. This is much as it happens with the public debt, and,as a 
matter of fact, some States of the US have suffered risk premia in their public bonds due to 
this sort of consideration
1. But this is nothing in comparison to the related to the dramatic 
balance of payment cum currency crises that have typically characterised countries 
separated from the rest by a currency. In other words, there is no scope for dramatic current 
reversals and exchange rate crises. Thus, the conventional wisdom that currency account 
imbalances in a CU hardly matter is based on the nimiety of their consequences. 
The experience in the EMU seems sobering so far. Countries which in the past 
suffered from (mild) current account reversals, have within EMU been able to maintain 
large current account and dynamism in the growth process. The cases of Spain and Greece 
are illustrated in the first two figures. While in the last decade the current account 
imbalances and exchange appreciations ended up in a drastic economic slowdown, currency 
                                                 
1 Incidentally, this is not the case with public debt in Europe, where risk premia are very small, in spite of the 
large different on the level of public debt among countries.  
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devaluations and mild current account reversals, the experience of the last decade –much of 
it within EMU or in the road towards it- shows that now these disequilibria have had no 
impact so far. However, this does not mean that these economies and their external 
imbalances do not matter. They do. In the case of Spain they cannot be explained in terms 
of productivity convergence, as the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis would suggest, but they 
are signalling an acute loss of competitiveness; in the case of Greece, the external 
imbalance is partially explained by a resilient public sector deficit which has surpassed in 
the last years the 3% Stability and Growth Pact ceiling. Portugal (last figure) is an even 
more interesting case. A country that after a successful convergence to EMU has got into 
serious problems. These problems are reflected in a large current account imbalance, a 
large public sector deficit and several economic plans both to reduce the fiscal deficit and 
to revive the economy, which  is trapped in a low growth situation. Probably, Portugal 
would have suffered the rigour of the markets by now and an escudo devaluation to restore 
relative prices would have been unavoidable. In EMU this is not feasible anymore, but this 
does not mean that the adjustment process is not painful, it is protracted, long and with no 
easy way out. Thus, the impossibility of a sudden current account plus currency adjustment 
seems to be a mixed blessing. 
This review of some of the former ‘periphery’ EMU economies highlights that the 
fact that the CU conjures up the possibility that the cumulation current account imbalances 
lead to financial problems and that may translate into a currency crises does not implies that 
they do not matter. Actually, they may signal deeper problems that, as a matter of fact, are 
more difficult to overcome within a CU because the eventual adjustment has to fall mostly  
on the real side.   
 
2. Comments on the results 
The approach by Edwards allows to underscore this important insight  in existing  
CUs  but he goes much further by showing that in the extant CUs the probability of current 
account reversals is not lower, and actually for most of the specifications, the sign relating 
CUs and the probability of reversals is positive, albeit non-siginificant.  This is rather 
striking given the comments in the previous sections.  The evidence is based on a large   42
sample of countries and a quite robust econometric analysis, so why does the probability 
turns out to be higher?. The reason is the sample used, which covers all the CU existing at 
1996. Euro area countries are thus not included. As a result most of the countries are small, 
underdeveloped economies, whose (in most cases extremely underdeveloped) financial 
systems are actually far from being integrated with that of the currency anchor country –in 
most cases, the metropoli or ex-metropoli.  This sample bias severely determines the results 
so their validity for the case of EMU-type monetary Union does not apply.  
The second conclusion of the analysis, namely, that the real cost of sudden stops and 
current account reversals is higher with a CU is reasonable but it also merits some 
additional comment. The empirical analysis identifies the external shocks but, of course, it 
does not considers the quantity of potential shocks –mainly in the monetary and financial 
domain- that a CU shelters from or simply avoids. A CU slashes the ability to generate 
idiosyncratic monetary shocks since theres no autonomous monetary policy, nor runs on the 
currency and it also tends to protect from other possible external shocks. Even some 
internal shocks which might have consequences outside a CU are dismissed by the markets. 
Examples of the first are the reduced impact that the Latin American crises at the beginning 
of the decade had on the Spanish markets –in term of risk premia- in spite of the relatively 
large exposure of the latter economy to Latin America; an example of the second is the 
negligible consequences of fiscal indiscipline within EMU. Note that in this second case, 




This paper has the virtue to make the reader reflect both on the consequences and on 
the premises for a process of monetary unification. These final reflections convey  on the 
one hand the European experience and on the other hand the Latin America prospects. 
In the case of the European Monetary Union, current account reversals of the type 
considered by Edwarsds (sudden, large) are unfeasible since the countries within the Union 
share a highly –albeit not perfectly integrated- financial market. This is not to mean that   43
current account imbalances are non-relevant. On the contrary, in some stances the 
accumulation of current account imbalances may signal future and mounting problems for 
the economy. Thus they are a symptom rather than a problem themselves but in any case 
complacency or disregard should be avoided. 
For Latin America, the lessons to draw are inspired both by the approach of the paper 
and on the different nature of CU in Europe, usually an inspiration for Latin Americans 
when thinking of integration. The lesson would be that as a precondition for monetary 
integration a sufficiently deep process of economic integration is relevant. Note that this is 
not to say that all the preconditions for an optimal currency areas should be met –as a 
matter of fact, EMU is still far from being a OCA. Furthermore, the sheer operation of a 
CU may improve the conditions to form it, strengthening the process as it proceeds. In 
other words, a potentially successful process of monetary integration should strike the right 
balance between the coronation theory –countries should be ready enough to share their 
currencies- and endogeneity –countries within a CU develop mechanisms to improve the 
premises to form one.  
Clearly, Latin America is far from fulfilling the loosest of the preconditions, even if 
quite relevant integration steps were taken in the decade of the nineties. However, these 
processes, either were not seen as a first step to monetary integration (NAFTA), or –when 
their ambitious were higher- they have suffered from serious reversals (Mercosur). The 
European process shows that the process is long, protracted and that it has to show a rather 
continous progress –ever increasing integration-. This continuity was feed by a series of 
characteristics that, as far as one can see, do not apply to Latin America: i) the push for 
integration was sustained and firmly framed in a strong institutional setting; in Latin 
America the process proceeds in an institutional vacuum and moves forward by arbitrary, 
spasmodic political impulses, with no uniqe direction; furthermore, it is difficult to 
envisage a strong institutional common framework where individual institutional 
frameworks are weak; ii) the existence of internal anchors of the process  allow to see 
emulation as a driving force, and the relative homogeneity –in terms of size and economic 
development- of countries has also helped to shape a process of balanced integration; ii) in 
Latin America, the potential anchor (U.S) is external, too large and  disengaged of the 
process of integration beyond the idea of a pure free trade area; iii) the economic and trade   44
structure –too biased towards commodities in several cases- is also a handicap for  the 
integration of the consumption markets –one of the big driving forces of EU countries; and 
iv) economic instability has proved a big hindrance to the process.  
Looking ahead, there may be then some scope for optimism for Latin America in the 
medium run. The recent progress in economic stability and the configuration of multiple 
interregional trade agreements (although the big one, FTAA, seems ever further away)  
might increase in the medium run the appetite for more economic integration and also the 
premises to advance in a process of tighter monetary coordination. If  this were to 
happen,our previous reflections suggest that a final irony may arise: In the process of 
getting ready for a CU,-by achieving a stronger economic and institutional setting-the 
problems a CU is supposed to mitigate –in this case current account reversals- will be  
mostly overcome by then. 
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